Heterogeneous guilt sensitivities and incentive effects

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30 Août 2017
Types de publication: 
Cahier de recherche
Auteur(s): 
Charles Bellemare
Alexander Sebald
Sigrid Suetens
Axe de recherche: 
Enjeux économiques et financiers
Mots-clés: 
guilt sensitivity
psychological game theory
Heterogeneity
stakes
dictator game
Classification JEL: 
A13
C91

Psychological games of guilt aversion assume that preferences depend on (beliefs about) beliefs and on the guilt sensitivity of the decision-maker. We present an experiment designed to measure guilt sensitivities at the individual level for various stake sizes. We use the data to estimate a structural choice model that allows for heterogeneity, and permits that guilt sensitivities depend on stake size. We find substantial heterogeneity of guilt sensitivities in our population, with 60% of decision makers displaying stake-dependent guilt sensitivity. For these decision makers, we find that average guilt sensitivities are significantly different from zero for all stakes considered, while significantly decreasing with the level of stakes.

Contact: 

Bellemare: Département d’économique, Université Laval, CRREP, - cbellemare@ecn.ulaval.ca

Sebald: Department of economics, University of Copenhagen - Alexander.Sebald@econ.ku.dk

Suetens: Tilburg University, CentER, and TILEC - S.Suetens@uvt.nl