We extend the search-matching model of the marriage market of Shimer and Smith (2000) to allow for labor supply, home production, match-specific shocks and endogenous divorce. We study nonparametric identification using panel data on marital status, education, family values, wages, and market and non market hours, and we develop a semiparametric estimator. We estimate how much sorting results from time use specialization or homophilic preferences. We estimate how equilibrium marriage formation affects the wage elasticities of market and non market hours. We estimate individuals’ willingness to pay for marriage and quantify the redistributive effect of intrahousehold resource sharing.
Goussé : Université Laval, Départment of Economics firstname.lastname@example.org
Jacquement: Paris School of Economics and Université Paris nicolas.Jacquemet@univ-paris1.fr
Robin : Sciences Po, Paris and University College of London, email@example.com